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TL;DR
US business-sector output rose 10.0% from the end of 2022 to the second quarter of 2026, while hours worked rose 0.9%, according to calculations using BLS indexes. Productivity has grown faster than in the prior decade, but the figures do not show that AI caused the shift, and employment and wage gains remain uneven.
US output has risen much faster than hours worked since late 2022, according to government statistics cited in a November 1 report by Thorsten Meyer, sharpening debate over whether artificial intelligence is boosting productivity while slowing hiring. Business-sector output increased 10.0% between the fourth quarter of 2022 and the second quarter of 2026, while hours worked rose 0.9%, based on the report’s calculations from Bureau of Labor Statistics indexes. The data establish a productivity gap, but do not establish that AI caused it.
The latest figures show a strong economy alongside modest employment growth. The Bureau of Economic Analysis’s advance estimate put real GDP growth at a 3.4% annual rate in the third quarter of 2026, up from 2.2% in the second quarter. Consumer spending, investment and government spending all contributed, according to the BEA. The report says computers and software accounted for about a third of third-quarter growth, much of it associated with AI investment; that interpretation is not evidence that AI itself produced the broader productivity gains.
For the nonfarm business sector, the BLS reported that output grew 2.5% over the year to the second quarter of 2026, while hours worked increased 0.2%. Productivity, or output per hour, rose 2.2% over that period. The report calculates that productivity grew an average of 2.1% annually from the end of 2019, compared with 1.5% annually from 2007 to 2019. Its 10.0% output and 0.9% hours figures cover the period from the fourth quarter of 2022 to the second quarter of 2026; they are cumulative changes, not annual rates.
Labor-market indicators show that growth has not translated into broad-based hiring or higher real pay. Payrolls grew by 496,000 over the 12 months to September, with health care and social assistance adding 520,000 jobs. Information industries lost 120,000 jobs and remained 12% below their November 2022 peak. The report also cites real private-sector wages falling 0.6% over the year to September and the labor share of business output reaching 52.8% in the second quarter, its lowest level since the series began in 1947.
Infographic 01 · More output, same hours
Ten percent more output, almost the same hours
The US business sector produces much more than three years ago with almost no extra work. The new jobs are mostly in health care.
The last 12 months
Nonfarm business sector, Q2 2025 to Q2 2026
- Outputreal, value added+2.5%
- Productivityoutput per hour+2.2%
- Hours workedall workers+0.2%
Where the jobs went
Payroll jobs, change over 12 months to Sep 2026 (preliminary)
Since Q4 2022: output +10.0%, hours +0.9%, productivity +9.1% (my arithmetic from the BLS indexes). Hiring rate in Aug 2026: 3.3% of jobs (2019 average 3.9%); layoff rate 1.0% (2019: 1.2%). Correlation, not proof of cause.
Sources: BLS, Productivity and Costs Q2 2026 (3 Sep 2026) · BLS, Employment Situation Sep 2026 · BLS, JOLTS Aug 2026.
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Productivity Gains, Uneven Payoffs
The gap between output and hours matters because productivity can support economic growth without a matching increase in labor input. If firms produce more with the same staff time, they may expand output or lower costs. But productivity data alone do not show whether workers will benefit through higher pay, shorter hours, more jobs or a greater share of business income. The cited figures point to a distribution question: output is rising, while real private-sector wages and labor’s share have weakened.
The labor-market pattern is also uneven across industries and groups. Health care and social assistance accounted for more payroll growth than the net total cited for the year, while information employment contracted. Overall unemployment was 4.2%, but the report gives rates of 8.0% for workers aged 20 to 24 and 7.0% for Black workers. Those figures do not by themselves identify why hiring has been weak, but they show that a growing economy can still leave some workers facing tougher entry and employment conditions.
For businesses, the issue is whether current output gains can persist and how they affect staffing, investment and wages. For policymakers, the figures raise questions about who captures productivity gains. Neither question can be answered by treating a coincident rise in productivity and growth in AI investment as proof of cause and effect.
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What the Productivity Figures Measure
Productivity is output divided by hours worked. The BLS measure discussed in the report covers the nonfarm business sector: private businesses other than farms. It excludes government, nonprofits and households, so it should not be read as a measure of productivity across the entire economy. A rise can reflect more output in the same hours, fewer hours for the same output, or a combination of changes.
The fourth quarter of 2022 is used as a reference point because ChatGPT launched on November 30 of that year, marking the public arrival of widely discussed generative AI tools. But a convenient timeline marker is not a test of causation. The report notes that information-sector employment began falling before generative AI was in widespread business use, and that only about one in four US businesses reported using AI in early October, according to the Census Bureau.
The report also cites differing trends in Europe: more jobs alongside flat productivity. That comparison suggests the relationship between employment and productivity can vary by region, but the supplied material does not provide enough detail to make a direct, like-for-like comparison or explain the difference.
“Productivity grew 2.2% from the second quarter of 2025 to the second quarter of 2026.”
— Thorsten Meyer, citing the Bureau of Labor Statistics
AI’s Role Remains Unproven
The main unresolved issue is whether AI is responsible for a meaningful share of the productivity increase. The figures cover a period in which AI investment and use expanded, but they do not isolate AI’s contribution from other explanations, including changes in industry mix, investment, business practices or economic conditions. The report explicitly cautions that simultaneous trends do not establish causation.
AI use also remains limited in the cited business survey: roughly one in four US businesses said it used AI in early October. That measure does not describe how intensively firms use AI or whether adoption has changed staffing, output or hours at those firms. The reported job losses in information industries began before widespread generative-AI use, according to the source, further complicating a direct explanation.
Other details remain uncertain, including whether the productivity pace will continue, how much of the wage and labor-share decline reflects temporary conditions, and whether weaker hiring will persist. The supplied material gives no firm-level evidence linking AI adoption to particular job losses or measured productivity gains.
Watch Hiring, Pay and Adoption
The next evidence will come from subsequent releases of GDP, productivity, payroll, wage and labor-share data, alongside new Census Bureau measures of business AI use. Those series can show whether output continues to outpace hours and whether hiring and real pay improve, but aggregate statistics alone may still not identify AI’s effect.
More direct answers would require evidence comparing firms or industries with different levels of AI adoption, while accounting for other changes in their investment and operations. Until such evidence is available, the careful conclusion is limited: US productivity has accelerated relative to the prior decade and output has risen far more than hours since late 2022, but the cause and distribution of those gains remain unsettled.
Key Questions
What is the main development in the US economy?
Business-sector output rose 10.0% from the fourth quarter of 2022 to the second quarter of 2026, while hours worked rose 0.9%, according to calculations from BLS indexes cited by Thorsten Meyer.
Does the data prove AI is causing job losses?
No. The figures show productivity gains and changes in employment, but they do not establish that AI caused job losses or the productivity increase. The source says information-sector employment had begun falling before generative AI was widely used in business.
What does the 2.2% productivity figure refer to?
It is the increase in nonfarm business-sector productivity from the second quarter of 2025 to the second quarter of 2026, as reported by the BLS. Productivity measures output per hour worked.
Are workers sharing in the output gains?
The cited indicators suggest the gains have not yet translated into broad wage growth: real private-sector wages fell 0.6% over the year to September, and labor’s share of business output was 52.8% in the second quarter. Those aggregate figures do not explain how every worker or industry fared.
How widespread is business use of AI?
The report cites a Census Bureau measure showing that about one in four US businesses said it used AI in early October. The figure does not show how extensively those businesses use AI or what effect it has had on their output or staffing.
Source: ThorstenMeyerAI.com
